China, China, China!

Trump tried to impose peace, and failed. Next phase? Putin will stab Trump in the back.

First free ebooks, then essay, finally word of the day:

Why Trump Won, Why Clinton Lost

U.S. Constitutional Law for German Speaking Jurists

European Union Law and Globalisation

CORPORATE LAW: PROFIT, POWER, PRINCIPLES

The Lion's Share? A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO ALL ASPECTS OF US CORPORATE LAW AND FINANCE

International Corporate Crime Law

War is Math: How to Use Wargaming to Prevent & Win Wars

China’s New Client States?

Mastering Contract Law for the Multistate Bar Exam Multiple Choice Section

Mom Monster Mermaid

The Future Is Bipolar: U.S.-China Decoupling & Strategic Containment

In the waning light of a unipolar world order, the most consequential bilateral relationship of the 21st century is undergoing an irreversible transformation. The economic decoupling of the United States and China is not only probable—it is a deliberate and increasingly explicit objective of both governments. This development is not a sudden or unexpected rupture. It is however much like a gigantic tectonic shift, long in the making with global consequences. This grand strategic shift is the result in diverging ideologies, incompatible objectives, and a slow-motion realization that the post-Cold War dream of convergence through capitalism has failed. The world’s two great powers are not drifting apart by accident. They are both pulling apart from each other intentionally.

To understand this, we must begin with a foundational premise: the security architecture erected by the United States after World War II enabled China’s economic miracle. The open sea lanes, global financial system, and relatively predictable order provided by the Pax Americana were essential ingredients in China’s rapid ascent from mass destitution to geopolitical centrality. And yet, China has chosen to challenge that very order, passively since 9/11 and actively since 2008. China's actions—militarizing the South China Sea, deploying coercive economic measures, and building parallel institutions—are not nerely assertive, they seek to revise and build a Chinese world order. This is not a moral indictment but a structural observation: China seeks to fundamentally change a system that made its rise possible because it views that system as inherently American and therefore suspect and constraining.

This irony is not lost on American strategists. We once believed that as China grew wealthier and more secure, it would become more liberal, more cooperative, and less aggressive. Those assumptions were tragically naïve. Today, China is no longer desperate—and yet it remains authoritarian, opaque, and worst of all: adversarial. The lesson has been internalized in Washington, across administrations and party lines. The resulting recalibration consequent to all that is not a matter of emotion or ideology but of systemic logic: a state that leverages the benefits of an order while actively undermining its norms cannot indefinitely enjoy the fruits and the freedoms of that system. Hence, decoupling—selective, strategic, and accelerating—is not only justified but necessary.

However, let us be clear: economic decoupling does *not* entail economic destruction. The United States does not seek, nor could it benefit from, the collapse of the Chinese economy. Such an outcome would not only trigger global turmoil but would almost certainly radicalize Beijing, inviting desperate moves and fracturing global supply chains beyond repair. Instead, the U.S. goal is to contain China militarily and strategically—particularly in military technologies like semiconductors, space, and undersea capabilities—while permitting China to remain a globally integrated manufacturing and trade hub. This is a tightrope walk, and it will not be perfect. But it is the only plausible route to balancing competition and productivity with security and stability.

America, despite Chinese challenges, remains powerful. One need only glance at the historical record to understand that the United States, when motivated, is perfectly capable of instigating regime change—not merely by force, but through information, financial pressure, and covert influence. This is not a boast; it is a warning. China knows this history well. Mao’s China, too, exported revolution with missionary zeal, often destabilizing neighbors and seeking ideological converts. The consequences? A poorer more violent world. The irony is rich: the very state now obsessed with non-interference once sowed upheaval in the name of proletarian internationalism. That China has abandoned its revolutionary fever-dream is to its credit. Unlike Russia under Putin, China does not appear bent on self-destruction. It remains a rational albeit relentless actor. This distinction is critical. It is why the United States, while preparing for long-term rivalry, does not treat China as a pariah.

A more constructive relationship with China is not out of reach—it is simply conditional. The most compelling case for American leniency toward Beijing would be a decisive break by China with Moscow. Not a hedged neutrality, not a symbolic abstention at the United Nations, but a full-throated betrayal. The moment China helps liberate Siberia from Muscovy—then, and only then, could it expect a dramatic shift in Western posture. This is not fantasy. It is geopolitics: fluid, amoral, and unsentimental. The anti-colonial foundations of the People’s Republic should logically align it with Ukraine and against the revanchist fantasies of a Russian imperialism. Should Beijing choose that alignment, it would not merely win plaudits in the West—it would redraw the map of Eurasian influence.

In the meantime, decoupling proceeds in measured increments. High-end semiconductors are being walled off. Capital flows are being scrutinized. Data regimes are diverging. But the divergence is not universal. China is building real capacity in AI—especially in applications like generative audio and video, where technologies like Wan and audioX now outpace many Western competitors. These are not parlor tricks; they are strategic capabilities, vital for both surveillance and influence operations. Still, China’s chip dependence will remain a strategic ceiling. The current administration’s export controls, however flawed in execution, have identified the pressure point with painful clarity. And in a strange way, Beijing should welcome this challenge. Nations need challenges to meet and match. The technological gap gives China precisely the kind of narrative it excels at: a digital David rising against a hegemonic Goliath.

But make no mistake: this is not the Cold War. The United States is not facing a Soviet-style adversary. For one, the Chinese elite read, write, and study in English at a scale the Russians never approached. Their deep engagement with American institutions—universities, tech ecosystems, even Hollywood—has created an intellectual and cultural fluency that makes them far more capable competitors. This means that blunt-force ideological confrontation, Cold War-style, is likely to backfire. China is not inscrutable; it is embedded. And yet, being embedded is precisely why the current course is unsustainable. Integration without trust is a formula for endless friction.

As for the dream of democracy in China—one must approach it with the tragic knowledge that political transitions do not always produce liberal outcomes. Germany in 1933 was a constitutional democracy too. What emerged from that democratic process was not liberty but terror. American liberals who moralize about Chinese authoritarianism must reckon with this: mass political change in China, were it to occur suddenly, could well produce not enlightenment but ultranationalism. A sober mind would prefer an evolutionary reform process, one that preserves stability while expanding rights. But such a process requires patience, time, and a lack of existential threat. That, paradoxically, is what American containment seeks to preserve: the room for China to change on its own terms.

The relationship between the United States and China is not in fact volatile. It is a condition of managed antagonism, distrust, and mutual necessity. Yet, they are likely their optimal trade and security posture. China is at peace and productive. The USA though challenged is not (and cannot be) defeated. No, you dont’ get the free military analysis why. See:

Clear Deterrent Signalling is Key to Peace.

You may not see it. Most people don’t. But strategic rivalry need not be total war. It can, and must, coexist with economic pragmatism and cultural exchange and integration. China will be globalized, just as the world becomes increasingly sinicized. The goal is not to destroy China, nor to dominate it, but to channel its power within a framework that preserves global order. The outcome is not predetermined. But the direction is clear. Two systems, one world—decoupling, yes, but with deliberate boundaries and under calculated restraint. This is not appeasement. It is balance. And history may one day thank both sides for choosing it.

Word of the Day: Stasis

- English: Stasis (n)

- French: Stase (n)

- Spanish: Estasis (n)

- German: Stase (n)

- Estonian: staas (n)

- Russian: стазис (m)

- Ukrainian: стазис (m)

- Mandarin Chinese: 静止 (jìngzhǐ)

Sentence translations:

- English: China and the USA are in strategic stasis.

- French: La Chine et les États-Unis sont dans une stase stratégique.

- Spanish: China y Estados Unidos están en un estancamiento estratégico.

- German: China und die USA befinden sich in einer strategischen Stase.

- Estonian: Hiina ja Ameerika Ühendriigid on strateegilises staasis.

- Russian: Китай и США находятся в стратегическом стазисе.

- Ukrainian: Китай і США перебувають у стратегічному стазисі.

- Mandarin Chinese: 中国和美国处于战略静止状态。 (Zhōngguó hé Měiguó chǔyú zhànlüè jìngzhǐ zhuàngtài.)