🆓Free eBooks🕮🎄 a.i. & War

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I shall increasingly write about a.i. here’s another example.

古人像形聲意辨惡良

Synopsis:

It is no exaggeration to claim that large language models are as revolutionary as the computer and are more important and powerful than atomic weapons. This is because neural network architecture will have productive effects in medicine, writing, graphic arts, not because they will be much better at autonomous drone combat than rules based expert systems and a good argument can be made that RBEs will continue to outperform NN into the future. Though, NN can be used for casevac, demining I would never give targeting decisions to an autonomous unit due to friendly fire, not to mention enemy hacking.

The West imagines itself in a war of weapons with Beijing, at least sparring, where missiles and nukes are rooks and bishops with viruses and vaccines as pawns. But that is not the case. It is far worse: the West is in a war of ideas, and it is losing. Happily, Niall Ferguson is exactly positioned to recognize the competing ideas and select smart strategies as opposed to the horrible enshittified blob of neocon nonsense that drove the republic to waste 3 trillion dollars, tens of thousands of lives, all while blithely ignoring the rise of China. Will he rise to the challenge?

The Revolutionary Nature of Large Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are not merely incremental technological advances; they represent a paradigm shift on par with the invention of the computer or the splitting of the atom. Why? Because their implications span the entire spectrum of human activity. These models excel in domains ranging from natural language processing and translation to creative arts, legal analysis, and medical diagnostics. For example, consider GPT's application in detecting early-stage diseases through nuanced linguistic changes in patient speech, akin to how the advent of X-rays revolutionized diagnostics.

The presumption here is clear: these models do not simply replicate human cognition; they extend and amplify it. This is why the claim that they are "more important and powerful than atomic weapons" is defensible. Atomic weapons are tools of destruction; LLMs, by contrast, are tools of construction. However, both share a critical attribute: their potential for misuse. Just as nuclear technology catalyzed fears of annihilation and proliferation, LLMs raise ethical dilemmas concerning surveillance, propaganda, and the weaponization of knowledge.

Neural Networks vs. Rules-Based Systems: A Nuanced Debate

The suggestion that neural networks (NNs) will outperform rules-based expert systems (RBEs) in certain domains while lagging in others warrants scrutiny. Historically, rules-based systems dominated artificial intelligence research until the early 2000s. RBEs excel in environments where variables are predictable and rules are explicit, as evidenced by their success in logistics optimization and early gaming AI.

NNs, however, thrive in contexts where complexity and uncertainty abound. Consider AlphaFold’s success in protein folding—a problem long considered intractable by RBEs. Yet, there are scenarios where RBEs retain an edge, such as deterministic environments requiring verifiable outcomes. The presumption that autonomous neural network systems should never handle targeting decisions stems from valid concerns about reliability and ethics. Friendly fire incidents in military history, from the Battle of Kasserine Pass to the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, underscore the catastrophic consequences of misjudgments. Adding NN-driven autonomy to this volatile mix introduces risks of adversarial exploitation, as seen in cyberwarfare cases like the Stuxnet attack.

The West’s Misconception of the China Challenge

The framing of the West’s competition with Beijing as a purely military confrontation reveals a dangerous oversimplification. Historically, wars are rarely won by weapons alone; ideas, institutions, and economic resilience often determine the outcome. The Cold War’s conclusion hinged less on nuclear arsenals and more on the ideological and economic collapse of the Soviet Union.

Today, China’s strategy is not one of overt militaristic aggression but of comprehensive civilizational competition. The presumption that missiles and nukes are the central pieces on this chessboard obscures the far more pervasive tools in play: industrial policy, digital authoritarianism, and strategic investments in global infrastructure, as exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative. The U.S., by contrast, has squandered trillions on protracted conflicts with dubious strategic value. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars, which cost not only money but also geopolitical focus, exemplify what historian Niall Ferguson aptly terms "the enshittification of strategy."

The Ideological Battlefield

In this context, the real conflict is ideological. Beijing’s state capitalism, underpinned by centralized control and technological dominance, presents a compelling model to many in the Global South. Meanwhile, the West’s liberal democratic ideals, tarnished by domestic polarization and economic inequality, struggle to project influence. This is not merely a clash of governance styles but a contest over the future of human organization.

Niall Ferguson’s insights into the importance of historical analogies and cultural forces provide a necessary corrective to the neoconservative tendency toward militarized myopia. Ferguson’s analysis of the British Empire’s decline offers clear lessons: economic overstretch and ideological complacency are fatal. The West’s current trajectory—obsessing over military hardware while neglecting the soft power of education, technology, and cultural diplomacy—risks repeating these mistakes.

Smart Strategies for a Three-Way Street

If the metaphorical street has three lanes—technology, ideology, and military force—then the West’s task is clear: recalibrate. Technology must be wielded not just as a weapon but as a tool for societal betterment. Ideological renewal demands addressing internal divisions and recommitting to democratic principles. Military strength remains necessary but insufficient; it must be coupled with diplomacy and alliances rooted in shared values.

The revolutionary potential of Large Language Models extends far beyond technological innovation, reaching into the realm of geopolitics and global power dynamics. As these AI systems reshape industries and societies, they become pivotal in the ongoing rivalry between world powers, particularly the West and China. The competition for AI supremacy is not merely a technological race but a proxy for broader ideological and strategic conflicts. Just as the development of nuclear technology reshaped global politics in the 20th century, the mastery of AI and LLMs is poised to redefine international relations and the balance of power in the 21st century.

FAFO is a Three-Way Street

plus ça change, a clever french aphorism that turns on the dual meanings of "plus", which in French may mean "more" or "no more"... the more things change, the more they stay the same. The return of great power rivalry can be clearly seen in the ongoing ideological and technological rivalry between the West and China, as highlighted by Niall Ferguson's observations [1][2]. Will clearthink prevail or are we all doomed to more nopespeak?

The dynamics of power and influence are not unidirectional but rather multidimensional, like a giant, horribly stupid game of rock, paper, scissors with nukes, propaganda, and viruses, albeit with more complex interactions and feedback loops. Actions and decisions made by one great power can have far-reaching consequences in many different arenas, affecting not just the immediate parties involved but also third partyies and innocent bystanders.

Niall Ferguson's insights (1) on the need for the West to compete with China in every domain, from artificial intelligence to COVID vaccines, underscore the competitive nature of their relationship. However, symmetric strategies are inappropriate responses to asymmetric challenges: more ominously, we must be careful not to become the monster we think we must destroy. What works in one context may not work in another due to differences in size, demographics, and infrastructure, for example: the "one size fits all" approach of neoliberals and their neocon cousins has clearly failed.

The other risk is oversimplification, ignoring details to simplify complex conflicts into moral or ideological battles. This simplification can lead to misunderstandings and misapplications of strategies, ultimately hindering effective response and cooperation among allies.

The competition between the West and China is not just about military might or economic power but also about technological progress, particularly in many domains including but not limited to artificial intelligence, virology, aerospace, and industrial technologies. The race for technological supremacy is seen as a key aspect, with implications for global influence and security.

However, this competition also raises concerns about decoupling and the potential for a McCarthy-era witch hunt phase, where the debate becomes overly simplistic and polarized. The historical precedent of the Soviet Union's penetration into American science, including the Manhattan Project, serves as a cautionary tale about the need for vigilance while avoiding discriminatory measures.

The concept of "killer apps" that gave the West its historical advantage, as discussed by Ferguson (3), is also relevant here. These apps, which include aspects like the rule of law, the scientific revolution, and consumerism, have been instrumental in the West's dominance. However, the West's seeming loss of faith in these institutions and the rise of challenges like climate change pose significant questions about the future of this advantage.

Climate change, in particular, will likely be a dominant factor in the next hundred years, suggesting that the competition between the West and China will also be influenced by how each entity addresses this global challenge. The integration of AI and other technologies into strategies for mitigating and adapting to climate change could become a critical aspect of their rivalry.

The use of large language models and AI in military and diplomatic decision-making (4) introduces new dimensions to this competition. While these technologies offer potential advantages in terms of analysis and strategy, they also pose risks, including escalation and the potential for misuse [4]. The ethical considerations surrounding the development and deployment of AI [4] are crucial, given the potential for these technologies to exacerbate conflicts or be used in harmful ways.

In conclusion, the interplay between technological progress, particularly in AI and LLMs, and geopolitical competition presents challenges and opportunities for global powers. The West's misconception of its rivalry with China as primarily military underscores a critical failure to recognize the multifaceted nature of this competition. As Niall Ferguson astutely observes, the true battlefield lies in the realm of ideas, economic models, and technological innovation. The West must recalibrate its approach, leveraging its strengths in innovation and democratic values while addressing internal challenges that threaten its global standing. The future of this rivalry will be shaped not just by military might or economic power, but by the ability to harness transformative technologies like LLMs, adapt to global challenges such as climate change, and present a compelling vision for human progress. As we navigate this new era of great power competition, it is imperative to recognize that the tools of engagement extend far beyond traditional notions of warfare, encompassing the realms of ideology, technology, and societal resilience.

References:

[1] The Niall Ferguson model: why is China imitating Western imperialism?

https://links.org.au/niall-ferguson-model-why-china-imitating-western-imperialism

[2] Niall Ferguson on Cold War II and the Death of ‘Chimerica’

https://www.thewirechina.com/2020/11/08/niall-ferguson-on-cold-war-ii-and-the-death-of-chimerica/

[3] How 'The West' Beat 'The Rest' With Six 'Killer Apps' https://www.npr.org/transcripts/141942357

[4] Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Making https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.03408

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Word of the Day:

Here is the complete information:

The word of the day is "asymmetric warfare".

Translations:

1. French: La guerre asymétrique (pronounced "lah gerr ah-seh-meh-treek")

2. Spanish: Guerra asimétrica (pronounced "gwerr ah-see-meh-tree-kah")

3. German: Asymmetrische Kriegsführung (pronounced "ah-seh-meh-tree-sheh kreeg-sfoo-ung")

4. Estonian: Asümmeetriline sõda (pronounced "ah-syoo-meh-trih-lah-in soh-dah")

5. Ukrainian: Асиметрична війна (Asymetrychna viyna, pronounced "ah-seh-meh-tree-ch-nah vee-y-nah")

6. Russian: Асимметричная война (Asimmetrichnaya voyna, pronounced "ah-seh-meh-tree-ch-nah-yah voh-y-nah")

7. Chinese (Simplified): (bù duì chèn zhàn, Pinyin: bù duì chèn zhàn, pronounced "boo dway chen jan")

8. Chinese (Traditional): (bù duì chèn zhàn, Pinyin: bù duì chèn zhàn, pronounced "boo dway chen jan") 不对称战 （无线战争）

Sample sentence: "The military strategist warned that the country was vulnerable to asymmetric warfare, where a smaller enemy force could inflict significant damage using unconventional tactics."

1. French: Le stratège militaire a averti que le pays était vulnérable à la guerre asymétrique, où une force ennemie plus petite pouvait causer des dégâts importants en utilisant des tactiques non conventionnelles.

2. Spanish: El estratega militar advirtió que el país era vulnerable a la guerra asimétrica, donde una fuerza enemiga más pequeña podría infligir daños significativos utilizando tácticas no convencionales.

3. German: Der Militärstrategie warnte, dass das Land anfällig für asymmetrische Kriegsführung war, wo eine kleinere feindliche Streitmacht erheblichen Schaden mit unkonventionellen Taktiken anrichten konnte.

4. Estonian: Sõjandusstrateeg võtnud hoiatas, et riik oli haavatav asümmeetrilise sõja suhtes, kus väiksem vaenulik jõud võis tekitada olulisi kahjustusi mittetraditsiooniliste taktikate abil.

5. Ukrainian: Військовий стратег попередив, що країна була вразлива до асиметричної війни, де менша ворогська сила могла завдати значної шкоди, використовуючи нетрадиційні тактики.

6. Russian: Военный стратег предупредил, что страна была уязвима для асимметричной войны, где меньшая вражеская сила могла нанести значительный ущерб, используя нетрадиционные тактики.

7. Chinese (Simplified): 军事战略家警告说，该国容 易受到不对称战争的影响，在那里，小型敌军可以使用非常规战术造成重大损害。